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CAUGHT IN A POLITICAL THICKET: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE 
Frank J. Sorauf* 
It was hardly a case to warrant front page coverage. It broke 
no new constitutional ground, and indeed it followed precedent al-
most slavishly. Nor did it affect practical politics in any way, for 
the statutory provision the Court struck down-one limiting the in-
dependent expenditures of PACs and others in publicly funded 
presidential elections-had never been enforced. But there it was, 
Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Ac-
tion Committee (FEC v. NCPAC),I not only in the front pages of 
our newspapers, but honored as well by a fleeting minute on the 
television news. 
Some of this attention certainly resulted from misunderstand-
ing. A number of reporters confused the limits on independent 
spending with the limits on PAC contributions to candidates and 
proclaimed an opening of the ftoodgates.2 A good part of the atten-
tion, however, began in hope. For those concerned about the conse-
quences of sharply rising levels of campaign spending, there was 
hope that somehow, somewhere, a restraint on that rise might be 
found. Among the critics of Buckley v. Valeo there was the related 
hope that the Supreme Court might, in view of all that had hap-
pened in American campaign finance, reconsider its narrowing of 
Congress's power to regulate campaign spending. All of those 
hopes, moreover, had been raised by a broad hint from the Court 
that it might be prepared to modify the Buckley precedent. But the 
hint and the hopes proved illusory, only one of the mysteries of the 
last ten years in the constitutional law of campaign finance. 
So passed the latest episode in the Supreme Court's ill-starred 
effort to reconcile the first amendment with the widely-felt need to 
• Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. I am greatly indebted to 
my research assistants, David Linder and David Sousa, for their help in preparing this article. 
I. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985). 
2. So great was the confusion that the FEC was forced to rush assurances to journal-
ists that contribution limits remained intact. Common Cause also issued a "press advisory" 
to try to clarify the Court's ruling. 
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regulate campaign finance. In its own felicitous phrase the Court 
found itself trapped in a political thicket-but not the thicket of 
American politics per se so much as the barbed forest of its own 
misconceptions about American politics. Most distressing of all, in 
FEC v. NCPAC the Court gave no indication that it realized either 
the trap or its cause.3 
I. THE NEW ERA IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
Congress inaugurated the modem era of campaign finance in 
the 1970's. Largely in response to the greater spending and the 
larger media role in elections, it passed the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act (FECA) in 1971. This act is now remembered chiefly for 
its futile attempt to roll back the new tide of media-based politics. 
Those reform efforts, however, were soon overtaken by the events of 
Watergate and all of its related tales of perjury, abuse of executive 
power, political "dirty tricks," and the "laundering" of illegal polit-
ical contributions. The Watergate trauma led to substantial amend-
ments to the FECA in 1974, which completely recast the original 
work; both literally and contextually the FECA was more a product 
of 1974 than of 1971. 
It was that amalgam of pre- and post-Watergate legislation 
that the Supreme Court had before it for argument in late 1975. 
The legislation was enormously diverse and complex, for it was an 
ambitious attempt to restructure campaign finance. Concerning 
presidential campaigns, it established: 
-a program of public financing for the post-convention campaign; if a candidate 
chose to accept funding from the U.S. Treasury, he also had to agree to raise and 
spend no additional monies. 
-subsidies for the parties and their quadrennial nominating conventions. 
-a program of financing would-be Presidents in their attempts to get their parties' 
nominations, with requirements for raising individual contributions to get match-
ing public funds. 
In congressional campaigns, there was to be no public funding, but 
instead an extensive system of regulated private funding, with provi-
sions for: 
-limits on sums that parties, political committees (PACs), and individuals could 
contribute to candidates. 
-limits on 'the sums that could be spent "independently" on behalf of or in opposi-
tion to a candidate. Such ''independent" spending had to be without the help or 
connivance of the candidate aided. 
-limits on the total sums that candidates for Congress could spend in the primary 
and/or general election. 
3. The phrase ''political thicket" is Justice Felix Frankfurter's. Colgrove v. Green, 
328 u.s. 549, 556 (1946). 
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-limits on the amounts that candidates could spend from their own personal for-
tunes or those of their immediate families. 
--extensive reporting of their receipts and expenditures by candidates, parties, and 
PACs. 
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Concurrently, Congress created the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC), the first agency it had ever created for the specific task of 
receiving reports of campaign spending, verifying them, and making 
them and their aggregates available to the American public. 
Within little more than a year after passage of the 1974 amend-
ments, a substantial challenge to virtually every section of the 
FECA and its amendments was argued before the Supreme Court. 
The challenge was no accident, for Congress had provided amply 
for it in the 1974 amendments. It authorized challenges by virtually 
anyone ("any individual eligible vote in any election for the office of 
President"), for certification of constitutional questions to the ap-
propriate court of appeals, and for subsequent appeal directly to the 
Supreme Court ("no later than 20 days after the decision of the 
court of appeals"). Congress declared that it was to be "the duty of 
the court of appeals and of the Supreme Court ... to advance on 
the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the dispo-
sition of any matter certified .... "4 Expedition was accomplished 
when the Court announced its decision in Buckley v. Valeo,s on Jan-
uary 30, 1976. The statute, of course, had never been in effect for 
either a congressional or a presidential election. 
The plaintiffs in Buckley-four individuals and eight groups-
if not the proverbial strange bedfellows, were at least unexpected 
allies. James Buckley, the Conservative senator from New York, 
joined Eugene McCarthy, pied piper of the anti-war movement, and 
the New York Civil Liberties Union made alliance with the Ameri-
can Conservative Union. In what must surely be one of the longest 
per curiam decisions in its history, the Court upheld all of the provi-
sions for voluntary public funding of presidential campaigns, both 
before and after the conventions, as well as the spending limits that 
are attached to such aid. It also upheld the subsidies to the parties. 
But on the issues surrounding the regulation of congressional fi-
nance, the Court-to the amazement of many observers-upheld 
the limits on contributions to candidates but struck down all limits 
on spending: spending by candidates from their own funds or from 
funds given to them, and independent spending for or against a can-
didate by any individual or group. It also upheld the reporting 
4. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443. 
§ 315(a), (b), (c), 88 Stat. 1263, 1285-86 (1974). 
5. 424 U.S. I (1976). 
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requirements.6 
Central to the Court's holdings was the premise that campaign 
spending determines the quantity of political speech and is therefore 
protected by the first amendment: 
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political 
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by 
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the 
size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicat-
ing ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.7 
The Court decided that expenditure limits are "substantial rather 
than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of 
political speech."s A limit on contributions to candidates or com-
mittees, on the other hand, 
entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free 
communication. A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the 
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the 
support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase per-
ceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the 
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. 9 
Finally, associational freedoms were also at stake. "Making a con-
tribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person 
with a candidate. In addition, it enables like-minded persons to 
pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals."w 
The Court defined the legitimate interests served by the legisla-
tion narrowly, even grudgingly. It accepted the appellees' sugges-
tion of a governmental interest in "the prevention of corruption and 
the appearance of corruption." 11 But it explicitly rejected their as-
sertion of a governmental interest "in equalizing the relative ability 
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections."t2 
Indeed, noted the Court, "the concept that government may restrict 
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amend-
ment."t3 Only Justice White would have upheld the limits on 
expenditures. 
And so, unwittingly, the Supreme Court became one of the 
prime architects of the "new era" in American campaign finance. 
6. This is not an exhaustive list of all the issues in Buckley. For instance, the Court 
dealt at some length with the constitutionality of the FEC itself. 
7. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 19 (1976). 
8. /d. at 19. 
9. /d. at 20-21. 
10. /d. at 22. 
II. /d. at 25-27. 
12. /d. at 48. 
13. /d. at 48-49. 
1986] CAMPAIGN FINANCE 101 
Congress ended the domination of the large contributor as it began 
the new reign of the small contributor and the political action com-
mittee.I4 It also instituted the first system of full and open disclo-
sure of the transactions of campaign finance, and with it, greatly 
expanded media attention to money in politics. For its part the 
Court, by striking down limits on contributions, cleared the way for 
a striking increase in the sums of money spent on elections. 
Although public funding of presidential elections continued, it has 
not been extended to congressional campaigns, and the movement 
for public funding in the states has lost momentum. Is Indeed, the 
American Presidency remains the only office in the country for 
which the candidates may choose full public funding of the 
campaign. 
The cost of congressional campaigning rose from $99 million 
in 1976 to $374,000,000 in 1984. Discounting for inflation, the in-
crease was 109 percent.'6 While there were 1,146 PACs in 1976, 
there were 4,009 by the end of 1984. Independent expenditures in 
the presidential and congressional elections of 1976 were approxi-
mately $2,000,000; by 1984 they had ballooned to $23,400,000. 
Every scrap of data we have suggests that similar, if less dramatic, 
trends developed in the campaigns for state and local offices. Buck-
ley's logic struck down statutes attempting to set limits on cam-
paign spending in about two-thirds of the states. Harder to 
measure, public cynicism grew apace. Unlimited spending com-
bined with unlimited reporting-sometimes sensational and poorly 
informed as well-fed every populist fear and suspicion. 
II. FEC v. NCPAC: DOUBTS AND THEN CERTAINTY 
The statutory fragment at issue in FEC v. NCPAC had a brief 
but tantalizing history. It had been part of the original statute cre-
ating public funding for presidential campaigns. This act provided 
that no political committee (i.e., PAC) could make independent ex-
penditures in excess of $1,000 in support of a presidential candidate 
who had accepted public financing.l7 In all of the litigation at the 
time of the initial challenge in Buckley, the Court had failed to rule 
on its constitutionality. The Justices had, though, ruled that the 
14. Contrary to the impression one gets from the media, individual contributors (other 
than the candidate and his or her immediate family) still account for well over half of the 
campaign receipts of congressional candidates. 
15. At one time in the last decade as many as 15 states had a limited program of public 
funding for campaigns for some state offices; the total in mid-1985 was 12. 
16. All of my campaign finance data (unless otherwise noted) come from the official 
reports of the Federal Election Commission. 
17. 26 u.s.c. § 9012(f) (1982). 
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statutory limits on independent expenditures in congressional elec-
tions were unconstitutional, and most observers assumed that the 
logic of that holding would apply to Section 9012(f) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. But not the FEC. 
Operating at least publicly on the assumption of the clause's 
constitutionality, the FEC sought to enforce it in the 1980 presiden-
tial election. (The newly formed FEC had been either too surprised 
or too unprepared to deal with independent spending in the 1976 
presidential election.) In 1980, along with Common Cause, it 
forced the issue; it lost its test in the District Court for the District 
of Columbia, which ruled that the clause was manifestly unconstitu-
tional under the logic of Buckley. The Supreme Court heard the 
appeal and, to the enormous surprise of the "campaign finance 
bar," deadlocked on it, four-to-four in Common Cause v. Schmitt. Is 
In just two sentences the Court announced the vote (but not the 
line-up), the nonparticipation of Justice O'Connor, and the conse-
quent affirmation of the decision below that held the section 
unconstitutional. 
The outcome in Schmitt was clear, but its significance was not. 
Were four Justices signalling a desire to pull back from Buckley? 
Had all of the changes in American campaign finance since early 
1976 altered their constitutional calculus? Or were the four simply 
convinced that this limit on independent expenditures was some-
how different from the one the Court struck down in Buckley? The 
answer to those questions will probably never be known, for when 
the FEC persisted and brought the issue back to the Court in 1984 
in FEC v. NCPAC, the Court held 9012(f) unconstitutional. And 
only one new recruit, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined Justice By-
ron White, the single Justice in Buckley who would have upheld 
limits on independent spending. 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority was little more 
than a reaffirmation of Buckley and several subsequent elaborations 
upon it. "Reaffirmation" may not be quite the right word, however, 
for the Rehnquist rhetoric was in fact a shoring up, even a harden-
ing of the Buckley position. 
III. THE ONLY DEFENSIBLE INTEREST: 
PREVENTING CORRUPTION 
The heart of the jurisprudence deriving from Buckley is in the 
definition of the legitimate interests a legislature may pursue in reg-
ulating the constitutionally protected flow of campaign money. Af-
18. 455 u.s. 129 (1982). 
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ter some uncertainty, the Court made its position clear in FEC v. 
NCPAC: "We held in Buckley and reaffirmed in Citizens Against 
Rent Control that preventing corruption or the appearance of cor-
ruption are [sic] the only legitimate and compelling government in-
terests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances."I9 The 
phrase--corruption and the appearance of corruption-has a ring 
that most Americans will like. But its apparent clarity is deceptive, 
and its origin is at best clouded. Worst of all, it is irrelevant to the 
issues of contemporary campaign finance. 
The Court seems to have in mind one kind of corruption: the 
"buying" of subsequent legislative votes with campaign contribu-
tions. The Justices talk repeatedly about quid pro quos,2o and more 
recently the phrase "exchange of political favors" has appeared.2I 
Indeed, that understanding became the chief justification for strik-
ing down the limits on independent expenditures in FECA. "The 
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with 
a candidate or his agent," said the Buckley opinion, "not only un-
dermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also al-
leviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo 
for improper commitments from the candidate."22 This logic natu-
rally led to the later decision to strike down the regulation of contri-
butions in local referendum campaigns. No legislators or other 
policy makers are being elected; hence no one can be corrupted.23 
But while the quid pro quo is the nub of the matter, it is per-
haps not the totality of it. Even in Buckley bits of hedging language 
crept into the Court's opinion. "But laws making criminal the giv-
ing and taking of bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific 
attempts of those with money to influence governmental action."24 
In dealing with the disclosure sections of the FECA, moreover, the 
Court referred to Congress's effort "to achieve through publicity the 
maximum deterrence to corruption and undue influence possible. "2s 
What is the correctable evil? Is it only corruption or may it also be 
mere influence, or some intermediate sin of "undue influence"? 
And when is the arranging of a quid pro quo not bribery? 
In FEC v. NCPAC, however, Justice Rehnquist ended the 
shilly-shallying: "Corruption is a subversion of the political pro-
cess. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obliga-
19. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. 1459, 1469 (1985). 
20. E.g .• Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27, and NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1469. 
21. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1469. 
22. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 47. 
23. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981). 
24. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 27-28. 
25. /d. at 76. 
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tions of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or 
infusions of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corrup-
tion is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors. "26 
Clarity was reasserted, but the price was irrelevance. There may be 
instances of legislators or would-be legislators accepting campaign 
contributions in return for promised votes on bills or promised pres-
sure on public agencies-but no one thinks that such transactions 
are in any sense common, at least in the Congress. The real issue, 
rarely articulated very precisely, is one of excessive influence. The 
concern behind campaign finance legislation is not about corrup-
tion; it is about the danger that major contributors to successful 
candidates will receive in return some excessive measure of influ-
ence in the making of public policy. That influence may be in the 
form of "access" --open doors and sympathetic ears--or it may be 
in some extra weight of information or consideration on the scales 
of decision in policymaking. Indeed it may merely arise from the 
election of officials already sympathetic to the campaign contribu-
tor's values or ideology. 
To be sure, defining the issue as influence doesn't remove all of 
the ambiguities. In the apt words of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, influence "is a term with amoebic contours."27 Nor does it 
help to add adjectives such as excessive, improper, or undue.2s One 
of the legitimate purposes of political activity, after all, is to achieve 
political influence. In terms of campaign politics-whether money, 
labor, or knowledge is volunteered-influence is best and most eas-
ily achieved by electing like-minded politicians to public office. 
Similarly, political activity after the election-lobbying or citizen 
contact, for example-also aims at influence. And the purpose of 
the activity generally is to influence how public officials act, perhaps 
even to make sure that they will act in ways that they might not 
otherwise have chosen. Political persuasion, in other words, has a 
political purpose; it is not an end in itself, a mere art form or civic 
ceremony. 
If influence is the object of democratic politics, its uneven dis-
tribution is an unexceptional fact. Some candidates win elections 
and others lose; some groups persuade and some do not. The issue, 
rather, is the very uneven distribution of a political resource: 
money. The demand is not that all runners win the race or even 
26. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1469. 
27. New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Com-
mission, 82 N.J. 57, 76,411 A.2d 168, 177 (1980). 
28. "Undue influence" is a familiar term in other bodies of law, especially the law of 
wills. The distinctions employed there (which seem to hinge on free will) are of no help in 
legislative politics. 
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enter it, but that all runners begin from the same starting line. At 
bottom, therefore, the central issue in the politics of regulating cam-
paign finance is the mobilization of maldistributed political 
resources. 
IV. THE EXCLUSION OF ALTERNATIVE INTERESTS 
Early in its lengthy disquisitions in Buckley the Court noted 
that the appellees had offered three governmental interests to justify 
the restrictions of the FECA on contributions. The first, of course, 
was the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption. 
Beyond that, the appellees advanced two "ancillary" interests. The 
Court summed them up this way: 
First, the limits serve to mute the voices of affluent persons and groups in the elec-
tion process and thereby to equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect the 
outcome of elections. Second, it is argued, the ceilings may to some extent act as a 
brake on the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns and thereby serve to open the 
political system more widely to candidates without access to sources of large 
amounts of money.29 
Since the invocation of the "corruption" interest sufficed to sustain 
limits on contributions, the Court did not appraise the ancillary in-
terests in this context. It was forced to do so, though, in the process 
of striking down the limits on expenditures. In dealing with the 
alleged interest in "equalizing the relative ability of individuals and 
groups to influence the outcome of elections," the Court's prose was 
absolute and magisterial: 
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our 
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment, which was designed "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' "30 
And so ended the Court's consideration of governmental interests 
beyond those in its single, favored formulation. 
One wonders why the Justices found it necessary to specify the 
legitimate governmental interests. The Court's custom has long 
been to leave the legitimate legislative interests open and unspeci-
fied, especially in early cases articulating a newly defined first 
amendment right. The first and classic statement of the "clear and 
present danger" doctrine, for example, did not undertake to de-
scribe all "the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
29. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25-26. 
30. /d. at 48-49. The Court was quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
266, 269 (1964), which in tum was quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 
(1945) and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
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vent."31 The Court's usual approach, in other words, has been a 
case-by-case resolution. To the best of my knowledge, one finds an 
exclusive definition of legitimate interests only in the area of cam-
paign finance. 
Of all the potentially legitimate interests spumed or ignored by 
the Supreme Court, in Buckley and thereafter, none is more appeal-
ing than the legislative interest in preserving the integrity of the 
electoral process. It has an estimable history in constitutional juris-
prudence, and it relates easily to regulating political money. It 
shifts judicial attention from the nexus between campaign finance 
and governmental decision to that between campaign finance and 
the outcome of the election, from whether money "buys" influence 
in legislative and executive offices to whether it determines who sits 
in those offices in the first place. 
The Court's very first decision on campaign finance legislation, 
Burroughs v. United States,32 dealt with Congress's requirement in 
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 that certain political 
committees in presidential campaigns report publicly the names and 
addresses of their contributors and the sums of their contributions. 
The Court upheld the requirement, and Justice Sutherland's opin-
ion for the majority is peppered with references to Congress's inter-
est in protecting the integrity of the presidential election. 
To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safe-
guard such an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to 
deny the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection. 33 
Congress reached the conclusion that public disclosure of political contribu-
tions, together with the names of contributors and other details, would tend to pre-
vent the corrupt use of money to affect elections. 34 
Moreover, Sutherland quoted extensively from Ex parte Yar-
brough,3s a case upholding the legislation implementing the fif-
teenth amendment. For example: 
That a government whose essential character is republican, whose executive 
head and legislative body are both elective, whose most numerous and powerful 
branch of the legislature is elected by the people directly, has no power by appropri-
ate laws to secure this election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of 
fraud, is a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and demand the gravest 
consideration. 
31. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Cf United States v. O'Brien, 391 
u.s. 367, 376-77 (1968). 
32. 290 u.s. 534 (1934). 
33. Id. at 545. 
34. ld. at 548. 
35. 110 U.S. 651 (1884). 
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If it has not this power it is left helpless before the two great natural and histor-
ical enemies of all republics, open violence and insidious corruption. 36 
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Burroughs is, in short, a tantalizing bit of judicial history. The 
Court clearly had elections on its mind, and it spoke in terms of the 
legitimate interest of Congress in assuring their integrity. It spoke 
of "the corrupt use of money to affect elections," not simply of the 
corruption that results from money in elections. The emphasis was 
on affecting, even corrupting, the election itself. Of course, the 
Court spoke at a time (1934) when the buying of votes, the casting 
of votes from the graveyard, and the rigging of electoral counts 
were embarrassingly frequent in American politics.37 It is both the 
clear meaning of those words "to affect elections" and the history of 
American electoral corruption that the Supreme Court ignored 
when it quoted Burroughs in its Buckley decision. 
In the more than forty years between Burroughs and Buckley 
the Court began increasingly to refer to the legislative interest in 
protecting the "integrity of the electoral process." The phrase ap-
pears-in one variant or another-as early as 1957, more or less in 
passing. In upholding the statute that prohibited corporations and 
unions from contributing directly to candidates in federal elections, 
the Court noted that "what is involved here is the integrity of our 
electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the individual 
citizen for the successful functioning of that process. This case thus 
raises issues not less than basic to a democratic society."Js Then, 
quite strikingly, in the five years before Buckley the Court referred 
in at least seven cases to the legitimate interest of the states in pro-
tecting the integrity of elections. The Justices did not always deem 
this interest controlling, but they invariably conceded its impor-
tance. As the Court noted in a 1973 case upholding New York's 
requirement that voters register with the party of their choice thirty 
days before the primary: "It is clear that preservation of the integ-
rity of the electoral process is a legitimate and valid state goal."39 
In a case dealing with the constitutionality of filing fees for would-
be candidates, the opinion was even more expansive: "a State has 
an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political 
processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies. "40 
36. Id. at 657-58. 
37. See, e.g., E. SIKES, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRUPT-PRACTICES LEGISLATION 
(1928). This variety of electoral corruption also gave rise to a common body of state and 
local legislation on vote buying, on "treating" voters, on closing taverns on election day, and 
on campaigning near a voting place. 
38. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957). 
39. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973). 
40. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972). The other five cases were: Hill v. 
Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); American Party of 
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Not surprisingly, therefore, the court of appeals relied heavily 
on that interest in upholding all of the FECA in Buckley. In up-
holding the disclosure sections, for instance, the judges noted that 
the major disclosure provisions of the act "exact disclosure only 
when plainly and closely related to a substantial governmental in-
terest long recognized by the courts: protection of the integrity of 
federal elections. "41 The majority opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Buckley, however, mentioned this interest only once, and then very 
much in passing.42 Perhaps it was merely a surviving fragment in 
the cobbling together of the Court's long per curiam opinion. In-
deed, in Buckley the Court seems to have begun a quiet muting and 
narrowing of its commitment to the "integrity of electoral 
processes." The key to its disappearance-at least in the campaign 
finance cases-may well be in the 1982 case, FEC v. National Right 
to Work Committee,43 which involved the reporting status of the 
defendant under the FECA. In the majority opinion appear these 
phrases: 
[In an earlier case] we specifically affirmed the importance of preventing both the 
actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of 
public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption. 
These interests directly implicate "the integrity of our electoral process, and, not 
less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of that 
process. "44 
If those words have any clear meaning, it is that the "integrity of 
the electoral process" seems to have been swallowed up by or sub-
sumed under the Court's favored interest: preventing corruption 
and its appearance. In any event it is completely absent in the FEC 
v. NCPAC opinion. Only Justice White's dissent honors it. Why it 
fell into disfavor is but another of the mysteries in the recent juris-
prudence on campaign finance. 
Finally, there remains that cluster of interests the Court explic-
itly rejected in Buckley: the equalizing interests. To state such in-
terests in terms of the positions of individuals in the political system 
misstates the point. When government acts to limit individual 
rights, it acts on behalf of collective interests. The purpose is not to 
make groups or candidates equal; it is to uphold society's interest in 
evenly-matched debate, in the full and broad recruitment of candi-
dates, in responsible campaigning, and in the availability of viable 
Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); and Kusper v. 
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). 
41. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
42. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 58 (1976). 
43. 459 u.s. 197 (1982). 
44. Id. at 208 (quoting United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957)). 
1986] CAMPAIGN FINANCE 109 
alternatives for voters to choose between. It is those interests that 
many legislators have thought were seriously compromised by the 
uneven distribution of the major resource in campaigning. One 
may think of these interests as an aspect of the broader interest in 
preserving the integrity of elections. Or one may think of them as 
an aspect of preserving democratic processes. It pretty much comes 
down to the same thing. 
V. THE PROBLEMS OF PROOF 
Let us return to the Court's single legitimate interest: preven-
tion of real or apparent corruption. "Corruption" is obviously diffi-
cult to define. Equally troublesome is the problem of how to prove 
its existence. The proof problem can be divided into two related 
issues. How thoroughly will the Supreme Court review the evi-
dence on which the Congress and state legislatures act? And sec-
ond, with what kinds of evidence and by what standards of proof 
will one be able to persuade the Court?4s 
The first question is much easier to answer. We can be sure 
that the Court will review legislative determinations very thor-
oughly. That is its customary stance when first amendment free-
doms are at risk. Parties to a number of cases have urged the Court 
to defer to legislative judgments about these quintessentially polit-
ical questions. The language in several opinions indicates their 
failure: 
If appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative findings ... , these 
arguments would merit our consideration.46 
In addition, the record in this case does not support the California Supreme Court's 
conclusion .... 47 
If I found that the record before the California Supreme Court disclosed sufficient 
evidence to justify . . .. 48 
Even though the Justices-excepting Justice White49-have little 
experience in the kinds of campaigns governed by the FECA, they 
have shown no inclination in any case in the last decade to defer to 
greater legislative expertise. 
Thus, to the second issue: the kinds of evidence and proof. To 
show corruption in the narrow sense, involving a quid pro quo, one 
45. There has been little scholarly attention to these issues. A significant exception is 
Thorsness, Independent Expenditures: Can Survey Research Establish a Link to Declining 
Citizen Confidence in Government?, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 763 (1983). 
46. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978). 
47. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981). 
48. /d. at 301 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
49. Justice White coordinated the presidential campaign of John F. Kennedy in the 
Mountain States in 1960. 
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must offer evidence of specific behaviors and understandings. (The 
question of mere "appearances" we will take up shortly.) Such evi-
dence is very rare; one seldom hears even unsubstantiated allega-
tions of this kind of corruption. If one thinks more broadly of 
"improper" or "excessive" influence, one confronts new problems 
of both definition and proof. Those problems were all too apparent 
in the argument in FEC v. NCPAC. 
Supporters of the restrictions on independent spending at issue 
in that case confronted three imposing hurdles. They had to argue 
the corrupting nature of a kind of expenditure that the Court earlier 
had held could not, because of the absence of donor-candidate rela-
tionship, lead to corruption. Furthermore, the supporters of 
9012(f) had to show, if not some exchange involving a quid pro 
quo, at least some convincing kind of impropriety. Finally, they 
had to involve the President of the United States rather than some 
part of a large and diverse congressional contingent. 
Small wonder, then, that the attempts to surmount these hur-
dles-in the record, briefs, and oral argument-were unconvincing. 
There were stories of ambassadorships for wealthy contributors, of 
contributors rubbing shoulders with cabinet members at "confiden-
tial" policy briefings, of cabinet appointments for such successful 
fundraisers as James Edwards and Raymond Donovan. The trial 
court in FEC v. NCPAC was scornful of this "evanescent" evidence, 
noting especially that in the evidence on the political motivation of 
appointments "there is nothing even remotely resembling corrup-
tion involved."so 
Even without the constraints under which argument had to be 
made in FEC v. NCPAC, however, no scholar or journalist has yet 
established a causal relationship between campaign contributions 
and governmental preference for private economic interests. The 
financing of legislative campaigns offers the easiest case, and the 
most common approach is typified by Common Cause's revelations 
a few years ago that a large number of Congressmen who received 
campaign contributions from the automobile and truck dealers' 
PAC had voted to veto-legislative vetoes still being legal then-a 
proposed rule of the Federal Trade Commission that would have 
forced car dealers to put stickers on their used cars listing their vari-
ous shortcomings. Indeed, it is not especially difficult to show that, 
in some key and visible votes, members of the Congress support the 
position of people who give them money. Who would expect it to 
50. 578 F. Supp. 797, 830, 828 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The court, it should be noted, was 
applying a narrow concept of corruption, one it undoubtedly believed was mandated by 
Buckley. 
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be otherwise? The analytical problem is one of determining cause 
and effect; that is, do the votes follow the money, or does the money 
follow the votes?si 
Political scientists have another criticism of such studies, even 
of those that by sequences of events make a strong case for conclud-
ing that, at least in some instances, the vote has followed the 
money.s2 It is that they are "anecdotal"; the relationships are es-
tablished or even merely alleged only in a very small number of 
dramatic, titillating instances. Uncounted are the occasions in 
which there is no dramatic relationship or in which contributors, 
PACs for instance, lose in the congressional vote. Scholars have not 
found it easy to cope with the problem of trying to establish rela-
tionships between money and votes in larger numbers of roll calls in 
a congressional session. The most successful attempts have found 
only a small positive relationship.53 
Hopes, including judicial hopes, for a clearly established causal 
nexus between campaign money and governmental preference sim-
ply cannot be fulfilled. In the absence of compelling proof, scholars 
and journalists have great interpretive freedom. The result, for the 
courts, will be a bewildering range of judgment. Already, in fact, 
that range is present among the comments on Supreme Court deci-
sions beginning with Buckley. Most of the harshest critics proceed 
from the conviction that corruption, or at least gross impropriety, is 
already rampant. P ACs rather than parties or individual contribu-
tors, they believe, are the chief corruptors. Their data and conclu-
sions are drawn heavily from Elizabeth Drew's reportings4 and the 
studies of such Washington groups as Common Cause and Ralph 
Nader's Congress Watch.ss (Common Cause has organized a fund-
raising campaign against PACs, "People Against PACS," roundly 
declaring that Congress is "UP FOR GRABS to the highest PAC 
bidders.") 
51. Sorauf, Political Action Committees in American Politics, in TWENTIETH CENTURY 
FUND, WHAT PRICE PACs? 27 (1984). 
52. The reader should keep in mind that even when the vote follows the money there is 
not necessarily a case of bribery. There must be additional evidence of an explicit prior 
arrangement. 
53. See, e.g., ]. KAU & P. RUBIN, CONGRESSMEN, CONSTITUENTS, AND CONTRIBU-
TORS: DETERMINANTS OF ROLL CALL VOTING IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
(1982). The classic analysis of the determinants of congressional voting in the political sci-
ence literature is J. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (2d ed. 1981). 
54. E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY (1983). 
55. See, e.g., Nicholson, Political Campaign Expenditure Limitations and the Unconsti-
tutional Condition Doctrine, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 601 (1983); Wright, Money and the 
Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 609 (1982). 
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The conclusions of political scientists are more restrained.s6 
They frame the money-influence nexus as a part of the broader 
problem of explaining legislative behavior. Any number of influ-
ences or pressures may shape a legislator's vote on an issue: the 
voting constituency (the "folks back home"), the party leadership 
and caucus in the legislature, the party outside of the legislature, the 
President or governor, expert research and opinion, public opinion 
generally, individual or group lobbying, the personal values and 
outlooks of the legislator, and the contributors to the campaign 
treasury. Just where and with what effect that last source of influ-
ence enters the calculus of legislative decision is hard to pinpoint 
with much accuracy, but many scholars would agree with Larry J. 
Sabato: "PAC contributions do make a difference, at least on some 
occasions, in securing access and influencing the course of events on 
the House and Senate floors. But those occasions are not nearly as 
frequent as anti-PAC spokesmen, even congressmen themselves, 
often suggest."57 The occasions of substantial PAC influence, 
Sabato adds, tend to be those issues that are relatively invisible, nar-
row, and specialized-in short, those issues of which the other 
sources of influence are unaware or about which they are uncon-
cerned. And so it is with campaign contributions more generally. 
There is "some" influence, but perhaps not "undue" or "excessive" 
influence, let alone "corruption." 
If the empirical case on actual influence is uncertain, the one 
on "appearances," while more substantial, also raises problems. In 
the first place, whose perceptions does the Supreme Court have in 
mind? Most commentators assume that the Court is talking about 
general public opinion.ss By making that assumption one also 
transforms the question into one of confidence in democratic insti-
tutions-no less, that is, than the issue of the mass support neces-
sary for the legitimacy of democratic institutions. 
Informal, anecdotal evidence abounds that large numbers of 
Americans see a corrupting link between campaign contributions 
and the policies of government. Anyone who has spoken at any 
public forum on American campaign finance can report the fears 
56. See, e.g., Malbin, Looking Back at the Future of Campaign Finance Reform, in 
MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 232 (M. Malbin ed. 1984); L. SABATO, PAC 
POWER (1984). 
57. L. SABATO, supra note 56, at 135. 
58. There is, however, a troubling indication that at least one federal judge has the 
judiciary in mind. Consider this sentence: "Even large expenditures made by political com-
mittees not attached to any business or union create little appearance of corruption since 
there is little the president can do to benefit such committees financially." FEC v. NCPAC, 
578 F. Supp. 797, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
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that emerge in the question or discussion period.s9 Many members 
of Congress report the same fears; Representative Matthew F. Mc-
Hugh (Dem.-N.Y.) is typical: 
I don't have to tell you about the skepticism, if not cynicism, that prevails in our 
body politic. The average citizen sees increasing amounts of money going to polit-
ical campaigns because of a special interest and concludes, in many cases, at least, 
that this is corrupting the process. It may not be true, but the perception is cer-
tainly there and that is as important as the reality itself. If we ignore that, we ignore 
what's happening in the minds of people in our political system.60 
For a more systematic analysis of public opinion, one must rely 
on polls. The courts had substantial poll data before them in decid-
ing FEC v. NCPAC. There was first of all a Louis Harris poll from 
mid-1983. It asked respondents to indicate how much they would 
trust (e.g., "a great deal" to "not at all") a specific kind of PAC if 
that PAC were to "support and give money to" a presidential can-
didate in 1984. Substantial majorities responded that they would 
have little or no trust in NCPAC, labor PACs, or business and cor-
porate PACs. Then from a specially-commissioned poll conducted 
by the Roper organization, the plaintiffs introduced five questions 
asked of a national sample of adults. The questions included ones 
about possible contributors to presidential campaigns, reasons for 
wanting limits on contributions (of the eighty-five percent who fa-
vored limits, sixty percent said the reason was "too much influ-
ence"), and support for public funding of presidential campaigns. 
The final question is worth quoting in full: 
Since 1971 [sic] nearly every presidential candidate has chosen to receive Federal 
funds rather than raise his money from outside sources. But in recent elections 
some private interest groups have spent very large sums of money on television 
advertising to support a particular candidate. Some people say this is quite all right 
and very different from giving the same amount of money directly to the candidate. 
Others says it is a purely technical way of getting around the 1971 law and should 
be stopped. Do you think it is all right or should be stopped? 
While twenty-five percent of the respondents thought it "all right," 
sixty-five percent thought it "should be stopped."6I 
To no avail. The trial court in FEC v. NCPAC dismissed it all 
as irrelevant. Said the court: "Only distrust in the integrity of gov-
ernment engendered by the conduct proscribed by section 9012(f)'s 
prohibitions can save the statute. "62 Even the fifth and last question 
59. For something of the experience the reader can examine the transcript of one such 
session in 10 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 466 (1983). 
60. H. ALEXANDER & B. HAGGERTY, PACs AND PARTIES 59 (1984). 
61. These two surveys are fully summarized in the trial court's opinion in FEC v. 
NCPAC. They are reported in full as a joint stipulation of fact in the Joint Appendix submit-
ted by the parties before the Supreme Court. 
62. FEC v. NCPAC, 578 F. Supp. 797, 825 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
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of the Roper poll (quoted above) failed to move the court. Its re-
sults, the court thought, were "suggestive" but "fatally incomplete. 
The poll does not follow up on the question and ask why those so 
responding believe independent expenditures should be stopped. "63 
As an afterthought the court also suggested in a footnote that the 
question at issue was "leading and argumentative" and that polls 
generally raise "complicated hearsay problems." Only because the 
poll data did not survive under other provisions of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence did the court not test them against the hearsay 
rule.64 The Justices simply agreed with the trial court that "the 
evidence falls far short of being adequate for this purpose. "6s 
By the standards of the two courts in FEC v. NCPAC one can 
safely say that poll data will never "prove" the appearance of cor-
ruption. The fundamental mistake of the judges was to assume that 
the mass public has an "opinion" on specific sections of specific stat-
utes. Since many newspaper reporters and headline writers do not 
grasp the distinction between campaign contributions and in-
dependent expenditures, it seems safe to conclude that neither do 
most American adults. Public opinion will be about larger issues-
about "big money" in a generalized system of campaign finance. It 
will not be about 9012(f). The appearance of corruption for the 
public will involve a somewhat disorderly set of perceptions and 
attitudes about political institutions generally; about P ACs, corpo-
rations, and labor unions themselves; about the sums of money 
spent in campaigns; and even about the substance and events of the 
campaigns. 
Most students of American opinion and politics would, I sus-
pect, find the survey data in FEC v. NCPAC far more convincing 
than the courts did, especially in the context of a broader loss of 
confidence in American institutions. For example, the University of 
Michigan's Institute for Social Research has for some years been 
asking national adult samples: "Would you say the government is 
pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or 
that it is run for the benefit of all people?" In 1964 only twenty-
nine percent chose the "few big interests" option; in 1982 some 
sixty-one percent did.66 No one suggests that such a loss of confi-
dence in politicians and legislatures is the result only, or even 
chiefly, of campaign money. Indeed, even the direction of the rela-
tionship is unclear; perhaps loss of confidence in politics and gov-
63. /d. at 827. 
64. /d. at 827 n.42. 
65. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1470. 
66. Miller, Is Confidence Rebounding? Pus. OPINION, June-July 1983, at 17. On confi-
dence more generally, see also S. LIPSET & W. ScHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP (1983). 
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ernment makes people suspect the worst in campaign finance. But 
it seems clear that we have here a set of related data that are "of a 
piece" and that point to campaign finance as one element in a grow-
ing cynicism about American political institutions. 
In sum, we have a divergence here between reality and the ap-
pearance of reality. But appearances and perceptions are a potent 
reality in themselves. Many people see only the fiickerings on the 
wall of the cave. Their understandings about the impact of cash 
contributions to candidates or independent spending in a campaign 
will contribute to their evaluation of the American political system 
and thus to their conclusions about whether to trust it, obey it, and 
work within it. 
Unhappily, in its confusion about the nature of mass beliefs 
and their measurement, the Supreme Court has added another seri-
ous misunderstanding to its initial failure to grasp the important 
issues in the relationship between contributor and policymaker. In-
deed, in its standards of proof both for corruption and for the ap-
pearance of corruption the Court has made it virtually impossible to 
prove the conditions under which it will permit additional regula-
tions of American campaign finance. The Justices seem to be look-
ing for immediate, irrefutable causal evidence, but it is unlikely that 
anyone can find it for them. 
VI. THE OUTER LIMITS OF ADVOCACY 
To test the validity of statutory restrictions on the first amend-
ment rights of campaign spenders the Supreme Court has framed a 
vague and irrelevant question that admits of no easy, or perhaps 
even satisfactory, answers. Advocates and legislatures are seriously 
constrained. They are especially constrained in trying to get outside 
of the Court's doctrines, whether by urging it to soften its position 
or by calling its attention to the changing realities of American 
campaign finance. 
Consider the problem of the plaintiffs in FEC v. NCPAC-the 
Federal Election Commission, the Democratic party, and the Dem-
ocratic National Committee-and their chief friend, Common 
Cause. Should they have urged the Court to reconsider Buckley? 
On the one hand, there was the signal of the four-to-four vote in 
Common Cause v. Schmitt. Yet there was also the need to salvage a 
specific and limited statutory clause, even in the face of the Court's 
having struck down a limit on other independent spending in Buck-
ley. The advocates' choice is clear from the record and transcript of 
oral argument: they chose not to attack Buckley, despite the tanta-
lizing tie vote in Schmitt. Only Common Cause tried to move the 
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Court beyond Buckley. While not attacking the precedent directly, 
its brief argued that the lower court had given an excessively literal 
meaning to the concept of corruption. 67 (The Supreme Court, of 
course, did not agree.) Common Cause also tried to convince the 
Court that it might depart somewhat from Buckley without aban-
doning it: 
[T]he Buckley court was concerned primarily with the independent efforts of indi· 
viduals and informal groups, rather than the full scale, professional shadow cam-
paigns waged by appellees and similar political committees. . . . [T]he Court 
recognized that new patterns of conduct and new evidence of threats to the electoral 
process posed by purportedly independent spending might well cause the First 
Amendment balance to be struck differently.68 
The argument, once more, was to no avail. 
The nub of the problem is this: to go beyond the logic of Buck-
ley one must escape the Court's definition of the one legislative in-
terest, and then one must escape the Court's conviction that there is 
only one policy issue, and thus one interest, that justifies the regula-
tion of campaign money. The first of those "escapes" I have dis-
cussed already; the second of them, the more drastic one, needs 
elaboration here. 
For most observers there are two overriding policy issues in 
today's campaign finance: the impact that spenders have on the 
eventual making of public policy, and the impact of money on the 
campaign itself and the result of the election. The Court's recogni-
tion of a governmental interest in preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption addresses, however unsatisfactorily, the 
former of these issues. But it leaves the electoral problem un-
touched. Moreover, it is the electoral issues that are increasingly 
salient, and nowhere is that clearer than in the case of independent 
expenditures. The Supreme Court is largely correct that these ex-
penditures do not raise serious questions of direct influence on polit-
ical decisionmaking.69 But they do raise troubling questions about 
the integrity of American elections. In the 1984 campaigns, for 
example: 
-One citizen, Michael Goland of Los Angeles, spent (independently) more than 
$1,100,000 to defeat Senator Charles Percy of Illinois in his primary and general 
election campaigns for reelection. Goland's motives have never been made clear, 
but speculation centers on the possibility that he may have thought Percy insuffi-
67. Brief of Common Cause as Amicus Curiae at 31, FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. 1459 
(1985). 
68. /d. at 41. 
69. When NCPAC threatens members of Congress with campaigns to urge their defeat 
if they stray from its legislative preferences-as it has done sometimes-it does indeed raise 
an issue of policy making. 
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ciently supportive of Israel. No other individual has ever intervened to that ex-
tent in a campaign for the Congress. 
-In the Senate race in Texas, won by Republican Phil Gramm, a total of $731,643 
was spent independently by eighteen different groups and individuals. These 
totals, too, are without precedent. 
-Overall, independent expenditures in federal elections in 1984 totalled 
$23,400,000, with $17,500,000 in the presidential race and $6,000,000 in cam-
paigns for the House and Senate. The comparable figures for 1980 were 
$14,200,000, with the two components at $12,000,000 and $2,200,000. 
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Behind those facts are a number of important issues. The major one 
is responsibility. If a candidate's own campaign offends any voters, 
they can respond by voting for that candidate's opponent. If an 
independent campaign offends them, they have no recourse. Nor is 
there recourse for a candidate who finds that an independent cam-
paign intended to help his campaign is in fact hurting it. 
Recent trends in all aspects of campaign finance-including 
those of independent expenditures-suggest another issue in the in-
tegrity of elections: competition. For example, the amounts of 
money available to incumbents, and available early in the election 
cycle, are one reason they win reelection in such large numbers. In 
the 1984 congressional campaigns those general election candidates 
who were incumbents spent $187,000,000; their challengers spent 
only $93,100,000. (Political action committees, incidentally, gave 
seventy percent of their contributions in 1983-84 to incumbent 
members of the House and Senate running for reelection.) 
Competitiveness is a concept that applies to parties as well as 
to individual candidates. In recent years Republican Party commit-
tees active in national campaigns have been raising from three to 
five times as much money as comparable Democratic committees. 
The Republican Party raised $300,200,000 in 1983-84, the Demo-
crats $96,700,000. In addition, independent expenditures heavily 
favor Republican candidates; of the $17,500,000 spent in the 1984 
presidential campaign for example, ninety-one percent was in sup-
port of the Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan. Democratic 
candidates for Congress do maintain parity with the Republicans by 
reason of their advantage in incumbency, but Democratic candi-
dates for open seats in the House in 1984 spent an average of 
$359,843, Republicans an average of $401,196. 
The funding inequalities may well have reduced electoral com-
petition in the states and congressional districts. Any reduction of 
competition surely affects the health of our democracy, for without 
campaigns and elections that present well-defined and viable alter-
natives, the right to vote loses its central importance. Indeed, the 
major scholar working in the field, Gary Jacobson, concludes that 
while levels of campaign funding tend not to be related to the sue-
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cesses or failures of incumbents, they do affect the chances of chal-
lengers running against them-the larger the campaign treasury, 
the greater the share of the two-party vote in the election.7o Chal-
lengers obviously depend on ample campaign resources to overcome 
the advantages of incumbency. 
Once again, public perceptions are important. Many Ameri-
cans undoubtedly think that money can "buy" victory at the polls, 
even though scholars may find the subject more complex than that. 
The independent expenditures of the National Conservative Polit-
ical Action Committee (NCPAC) in 1983-84 afford an especially 
apt illustration of the image-reality gap. NCPAC reported expendi-
tures of $19,500,000 for the 1983-84 election period, a figure that 
was widely reported in the media with no explanation and with the 
implicit suggestion that all of the massive sum went directly into the 
campaign. In fact, NCPAC reported independent expenditures of 
$10,200,000 and contributions of $130,000, a total of $10,330,000 in 
political expenditures. But the careful probings of Michael Malbin 
discovered that eighty-five percent of the reported independent ex-
penditures actually went for direct mail and fund raising expenses; 
so the remaining fifteen percent of the $10,200,000 in independent 
spending comes only to $1,530,000. That figure, when added to the 
total of direct contributions, yields a "real" political spending figure 
of$1,660,000. No doubt the $19,500,000 total appeared in far more 
newspapers than the $1,660,000 tota1.7t 
Here again the question is whether appearances are more im-
portant than reality. The media focus on "big money," on large 
political organizations (i.e., PACs), and on mounting levels of cam-
paign spending. Even well-informed citizens have no way of know-
ing that PAC contributions still account for less than thirty percent 
of the receipts of congressional candidates and that individual con-
tributors still account for well over half. Nor do they know what a 
gross expenditure total, such as NCPAC's $19,500,000, really 
means. And nothing in their reading or experience gives them a 
sense of the complexity of congressional decisionmaking. 
On the Supreme Court, only Justice White has shown some 
inclination to take the problem of appearances seriously. In his dis-
sent in the Berkeley referendum case he ventured closer to the issue 
than has any of his colleagues: 
Perhaps, as I have said, neither the City of Berkeley nor the State of California 
70. G. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980). 
71. I am not aware of any newspaper that reported the latter figure. Malbin's research 
and the facts reported here are all contained in Brownstein, On Paper, Conservative PACs 
Were Tigers in 1984-But Look Again, 17 NAT'L J. 1504 (1985). 
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can "prove" that elections have been or can be unfairly won by special interest 
groups spending large sums of money, but there is a widespread conviction in legis-
lative halls, as well as among citizens, that the danger is real. I regret that the 
Court continues to disregard that hazard.72 
VII. CONCLUSION 
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Problems begin at the beginning, and so it was with Buckley. 
The Court found itself rushed to a premature adjudication of the 
many parts of the FECA before even one election had been held 
under its provisions. As Laurence Tribe has written: "One conse-
quence of this expedited review was that the Supreme Court, work-
ing in a factual vacuum, was forced to indulge in more than a little 
empirical speculation about such issues as the circumvention of ex-
penditure limits and the impact of those limits on campaign 
speech."73 In view of the immaturity of the issues in 1976, not to 
mention the paucity of data available to the Justices, one would 
have expected the Court to proceed with tentativeness and narrow-
ness of purpose. Circumspection was all the more strongly dictated 
by the fact that the statute at hand aimed to alter fundamentally the 
activities it regulated. 
And so the Justices marched into the thicket of American elec-
toral politics. They had been there before, but never recently in the 
most tangled patch of it all: the exceptionally complex system of 
American campaign finance. Its practices are arcane, its regula-
tions convoluted, its mysteries unknown even to many candidates 
themselves. The Justices, with one exception, had little experience 
in all of this, and in an important way they never really developed a 
feel for it. Despite all the arguments and stipulations in FEC v. 
NCPAC, for example, they never grasped the idea of a flow of 
money, which if stopped at one outlet would build up pressure at 
others. In their obsession with corruption of officials and their un-
concern for the well-being of the electoral process, moreover, they 
framed a jurisprudence that was strangely, even quaintly, at odds 
with contemporary political realities. 
Worse, perhaps, the Court never developed ways of relating its 
doctrine to realistic burdens of proof. It set-and allowed trial 
courts to set-standards of empirical proof for the governmental 
interests behind legislation that were beyond reason and beyond the 
standards of informed scholarship. In addition, by looking always 
for a direct, one-to-one, independent-to-dependent variable, causal 
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relationship, it betrayed some lack of sophistication about the enor-
mous complexity of social causation. To draw standards of proof 
for such relationships from the Federal Rules of Evidence is simply 
to misunderstand completely the causal problem at hand. 
On one matter in these cases, however, the Court was on much 
firmer ground: the importance of "appearances." Public confi-
dence in a political system is both as important and as fragile as it is 
in an economy or a banking system. If the appearance of corrup-
tion-or of excessive influence--reduces confidence in political in-
stitutions, it ultimately sacrifices a necessary condition for a 
politically active and law-abiding citizenry and, thus, a necessary 
condition for the health of the institutions themselves. 
Acceptable legal proof of those appearances will be hard to 
find, however, if FEC v. NCPAC is any measure. So the gap be-
tween reality and the image of reality seems destined to endure. But 
not without a striking irony. Popular perceptions will continue to 
be shaped by the extensive media coverage of campaign finance. 
This sensational reporting results largely from the disclosure provi-
sions of the FECA; to collect data about big financial transactions 
of any kind and then to make them easily available is inevitably to 
excite the attention of the media and thus to crank up its great 
imagemaking machines. 
In retrospect one wonders whether that four-to-four vote in 
Common Cause v. Schmitt reflected twinges of doubt about the cer-
tainties of Buckley. Were some of the Justices, no strangers to the 
mass media, beginning to develop concerns about appearances? 
Whether it was a signal or not, it produced no assault on Buckley, 
and it is not easy to imagine what circumstances might lead to such 
an assault. Meanwhile, Congress is left with the mangled torso of 
its major legislation on campaign finance and with the frustration 
that always accompanies a paucity of options. Most important, the 
gap between the reality of campaign finance and the mass percep-
tion of that reality remains. So, too, does the gap between that per-
ception-with its fears, its sense of inequity, and its growing 
cynicism-and the Supreme Court's celebration of the new consti-
tutional rights that prevent Congress from addressing the problem. 
To emphasize appearances is, of course, to concede a major 
role to illusion and emotion. All political reform movements, how-
ever, are fueled by simplistic explanations of reality; one would be 
hard put to think of a reform movement in American history with-
out a devil theory. The creation of "devils" is a useful mode of 
social explanation for many adults, and exorcism of these devils is 
an important way of reestablishing the credibility and legitimacy of 
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political institutions. The Supreme Court has failed to recognize 
that important fact about mass democratic opinion and consent in 
the past when it has stymied reform movements. That failure, in 
turn, is one very persuasive reason for deference to legislative as-
sessments of political beliefs and appearances. 
